Navigating the Complexities of US Sanctions on Russia: A Realistic Look at the Ukraine Conflict

On Wednesday, President Trump announced substantial new sanctions targeting Russia's major oil and gas companies. He also lifted restrictions on Ukraine's use of certain long-range missiles, allowing the country to strike deeper into Russian territory. These measures follow Trump's recent discussions with Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, highlighting his frustration with their respective intransigences. Despite Trump's hopes to bring an end to the ongoing war, these actions raise the question: will they be sufficient? When Russia instigated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States and its allies adopted a strategy focused on employing Washington's formidable political, economic, and military clout to impose high costs on Russia, prompting the Kremlin to seek peace on Ukraine's terms. While this cost-imposition approach makes theoretical sense, practical outcomes tell a different story. The strategy has succeeded in slowing Russia's advance, yet it has not convinced Putin to halt his aggression. Despite multiple rounds of sanctions and the delivery of more advanced weaponry to Ukraine, including the development of autonomous drones, Russia remains far from capitulating. Currently, Russian forces occupy more territory in Ukraine than they did three years ago, and as the war approaches its fifth year in February, there are worries that its prolonged nature could mirror the lengthy conflicts of the past. Proponents of the cost-imposition strategy argue for increased pressure, which includes an unwavering commitment to sanctions, more military aid to Ukraine—such as Tomahawk missiles that the U.S. has resisted supplying—and the seizure of frozen Russian assets in Europe. However, past measures have shown diminishing returns, particularly as Russia has adjusted to these new economic realities. The European Union is already on its 19th package of sanctions, yet the effects are muted, primarily due to Chinese support for Russia. From a military perspective, skepticism surrounds the added effectiveness of new weaponry. In 2023, calls for Abrams tanks to alter the course of the war fell flat, as those tanks did not yield the desired outcome. Similarly, the long-anticipated F-16s have not constituted the magic resolution some believed they would be. The relaxation of restrictions on Ukraine’s long-range strikes into Russia also failed to dramatically shift the balance in the conflict. Further complicating the situation is a logical contradiction within the cost-imposition strategy itself. Advocates maintain that serious negotiations with Russia are futile because of Putin's ambitions for total domination of Ukraine. Yet simultaneously, they suggest that incremental military and economic pressure will somehow compel Putin to change course. This dichotomy brings about an unsettling question: if Putin is indeed intent on total control, how can we expect that more pressure will lead to a breakthrough in negotiations? Admittedly, there are valid reasons for the U.S. and its allies to uphold significant costs on the Kremlin. The economic and military repercussions have indeed captured the attention of potential aggressors worldwide. Without Western support, Ukraine may have faced considerable difficulties in thwarting Russian advances and preserving its sovereignty. Pressuring the Kremlin is a crucial factor in pursuing a ceasefire, but it is not a standalone solution. Given these dynamics, it would be unrealistic to anticipate that new sanctions will resolve the conflict anytime soon unless they are paired with a willingness from the West to adopt a more open negotiating stance. This may entail making concessions that could appear more favorable to Russia than the West would prefer. For instance, if a resolution were to leave Russia in control of parts of the Donbas region, while deeply disappointing to Ukraine's supporters, it may still represent a preferable scenario compared to prolonged warfare. Some might argue that certain allies of Ukraine could prefer the conflict to continue as a way to deter the Russian threat by keeping them engaged in Ukraine. Yet a stagnating war without progress should prompt a reevaluation of what U.S. authority can practically achieve in Ukraine at sustainable costs. The reluctance to accept the limits of U.S. power has characterized past military involvements, from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan. The situation in Ukraine mirrors these historical patterns, and the focus on ambitious goals by the U.S. has often led to protracted entanglements devoid of tangible victories. While the U.S. remains a dominant global player, a failure to recognize the constraints of its power can undermine its international achievements and create political fractures domestically. Christopher S. Chivvis serves as a senior fellow and the director of the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Related Sources: • Source 1 • Source 2 • Source 3