The Evolving Threat of the Ghost Fleet: Sanctions Evasion and Maritime Security

In recent weeks, the United States has intensified its pressure campaign against the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by seizing two oil tankers off the coast of Venezuela and attempting to board a third. On another front, Ukraine has ramped up its attacks on Russian tankers in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and even in the Mediterranean. These simultaneous operations target what has come to be known as the 'ghost fleet'—a collection of ships used to transport and sell oil while evading international sanctions through a convoluted network of vessels, financial institutions, and shell companies aimed at obfuscating ownership and routes. Countries like Russia, Iran, and Venezuela heavily rely on this system to sustain their economies, funneling large quantities of oil primarily to China and India, while occasionally maintaining trade ties with Western nations that have imposed sanctions. The emergence of this ghost fleet, which is estimated to comprise between 1,000 to over 3,000 tankers, marks a significant uptick since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Previously, the count was below 500, showcasing how swiftly these operations have adapted to geopolitical pressures. The majority of these tankers are aging ships sourced from the secondhand market, often nearing the end of their operational life. Concealing their true ownership through complex layers of shell companies registered in jurisdictions with lax regulations—like the Seychelles, the Marshall Islands, and the United Arab Emirates—these vessels frequently change names and flags to escape detection. In extreme cases, they rely on completely fabricated documents to legitimize their operations. Due to sanctions, accessing Western insurance is impossible for these vessels, forcing them to turn to obscure Russian companies or operate without valid insurance coverage. To avoid surveillance when nearing destination ports or transferring cargo from sanctioned countries, these ghost ships often disable their transponders—the systems that broadcast their positions. Some have even been caught using GPS spoofing, which misleads authorities about their actual locations. Furthermore, a common practice involves transferring oil from one ship to another in international waters. This technique enables cargo from a ghost ship to appear legitimate, facilitating its sale without raising the red flags that typically accompany sanctioned oil. However, these clandestine operations not only undermine international sanctions but pose significant hazards. Aging and poorly maintained vessels increase the likelihood of accidents, including explosions, fires, and oil spills, severely jeopardizing marine ecosystems. Additionally, the absence of proper insurance means that no legal recourse exists in the event of mishaps, leaving crew members on these ships without guaranteed rights or contracts. Among the various players in this underhanded game, Russia stands out as the principal user of ghost ships. The European Union has recorded over 500 such vessels, with estimates suggesting the actual number could be even higher. Recently, Russian authorities have taken audacious steps by escorting these ghost tankers with military support and operating them under Russian flags, brazenly ignoring the need for subterfuge. Moreover, intelligence reports and investigative journalism have uncovered signs of Russian military contractors aboard some of these vessels, allegedly involved in acts of hybrid warfare against European nations. These operations encompass intimidation tactics, including deploying spy drones and sabotaging critical underwater data cables, aiming to disrupt essential communication networks. As the ghost fleet phenomenon continues to evolve, the intersection of geopolitical maneuverings and maritime security challenges becomes increasingly complex. The coalition of countries leveraging these tactics highlights the urgent need for enhanced global oversight and cooperation to address the undermining of international sanctions and safeguard the world's maritime environment. Related Sources: • Source 1 • Source 2